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ASSESSING THE EPA’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS UNDER CLEAN AIR ACT
SECTION 111(D) AND THE CLEAN POWER PLAN
RICK A. WALTMAN†
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations evoke world-
wide concern over climate change.1  Until recently, the United
States had no federal action aimed at curbing the nation’s share of
GHG output.2  In Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court com-
pelled the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to determine
whether mobile GHG emissions “endanger the public health and
welfare” and should be regulated.  After the Supreme Court’s 2007
Massachusetts v. EPA decision, the EPA has promulgated regulations
for regulating both mobile (cars, trucks, etc.) and stationary source
(power plants) GHGs.3  The EPA’s stationary source regulations in-
clude a controversial regulation promulgated in August 2015,
which targets existing stationary GHG sources under section 111(d)
of the Clean Air Act (CAA).4
The EPA’s newest and most controversial regulation, known as
the Clean Power Plan, was proposed on June 2, 2014.5  The EPA
released its final version of the Clean Power Plan on August 3, 2015
after receiving and considering millions of comments from state
governments, industry leaders, and advocacy groups.6  The EPA’s
† Independent Energy Attorney; J.D., 2015, University of San Diego School of
Law; B.S., 2010, University of Minnesota.
1. See Fifth Assessment Report, IPPC (2014), available at www.ipcc.ch (discussing
causes, impacts, and trajectory of climate change in a global meta analysis).
2. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511 (2007) (considering GHG regu-
lations for first time).
3. See Util. Air Regulatory Group v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S.Ct. 2427 (2014)
[hereinafter UARG] (upholding in part, and denying in part, regulations under
Section 108 and Title V of Clean Air Act).
4. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, EPA (2014), available at https://web.archive.org/web/2014
0602231412/http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/documents/
20140602proposal-cleanpowerplan.pdf (providing EPA’s statutory source
regulations).
5. See id. (discussing EPA’s new Clean Power Plan).
6. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 40 CRF 60 (Dec. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan],
available at www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-
rule.pdf (providing EPA promulgating final rule, and subject of Section III of this
(35)
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new Clean Power Plan allows states to use a range of methods to
meet their “best system of emissions reduction” (BSER) targets such
as efficiency improvements in older power plants, “environmental
dispatch,” alternative fuel generation, and demand-side energy effi-
ciency measures.7  The EPA’s Clean Power Plan specifically focuses
on electric plant generation emissions because they produce forty
percent of the nation’s overall GHG emissions.8  Environmental
supporters and industrial opponents challenging the Clean Power
Plan claim it does not go far enough and forces potential litigants
to challenge many of EPA’s interpretations and determinations
made in the final regulation.9
This article will begin by discussing the EPA’s history of regu-
lating GHGs under the CAA in Section II, specifically focusing on
the Supreme Court’s discussion of the EPA’s CAA authority.  This
article will continue in Section III by assessing the EPA’s authority
to regulate GHGs specifically under CAA section 111(d).  Section
IV outlines the Clean Power Plan’s main components and also ad-
dresses opponents’ arguments about the EPA’s faulty interpreta-
tions, inconclusive feasibility studies, and the poor fact-finding
made in promulgating the final rule.  Finally, this article concludes
by affirming the EPA’s interpretation of its statutory authority
under CAA 111(d) permitting it to regulate GHG emissions from
electricity generating units (EGUs) and how litigants challenging
the Clean Power Plan will most likely fail.10
article); see also The Clean Power Plan, Key Changes and Improvements from Proposal to
Final, EPA (Dec. 10, 2015), www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/docu
ments/fs-cpp-key-changes.pdf [hereinafter Key Changes and Improvements] (discuss-
ing subject matter of some comments in context of resulting final rule); see also
Study: Clean Power Plan Could Save Thousands of Lives, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
(May 4, 2015), www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/05/04/epa-clean-power-
plan-could-save-3-500-lives-a-year-study-says (highlighting that “The Clean Power
Plan attracted more than 4.3 million public comments to the EPA.”).
7. See EPA Fact Sheet—Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants, EPA (June 2,
2014), http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-numbers
[hereinafter Clean Power Plan Fact Sheet] (stating that agency expects that satis-
faction of all states’ carbon reduction goals will yield a reduction of roughly 870
million tons of carbon by 2030); see also Key Changes and Improvements, supra note 6
(discussing three “building blocks” comprising BSER in final Clean Power Plan).
8. See John M. Broder, Obama Readying Emissions Limits on Power Plants, N.Y.
TIMES (June 19, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/science/earth/obama-pre
paring-big-effort-to-curb-climate-change.html?_r=1& (discussing reasons that Presi-
dent Obama and advocates called for creation of Clean Power Plan, and oppo-
nents’ concerns over its potential economic effects).
9. See infra notes 134–144 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argu-
ments already being made against the Clean Power Plan.
10. See infra notes 33-59 for a discussion of Util. Air Regulatory Group and con-
cerns over regulating GHGs under the CAA section 111(d).  No plants will know if
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II. THE EPA’S HISTORY OF GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION
A. Massachusetts v. EPA: Whether Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Endanger Public Health and Welfare
Until September 8, 2003, the EPA never made a decision to
regulate GHGs.11  That day, however, the agency denied a rulemak-
ing petition that encouraged the EPA to regulate GHGs through
the CAA because the EPA claimed it did not have the statutory au-
thority under the CAA and because promulgating these types of
regulations “would be unwise . . . at this time.”12  Opponents who
disagreed with the EPA’s conclusions—consisting of intervener
states, local governments, and environmental advocacy groups—
filed a petition with the D.C. Circuit asking the court to review the
EPA’s decision to forego determining whether carbon dioxide was
an “air pollutant” which may “reasonably be anticipated to endan-
ger public health or welfare.”13  The D.C. Circuit denied opponents
petition, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari.14
The Supreme Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit and re-
manded the matter to the EPA, requiring the agency to conduct a
finding of whether carbon dioxide endangered the public health or
welfare.15  The Court reached this conclusion by finding that car-
bon dioxide fit within the CAA’s definition of “air pollutant.”16  Jus-
tice Stevens’ majority heavily scrutinized the EPA claiming it did
not have to regulate mobile carbon emissions because vehicle emis-
sions are already subject to regulation by the Department of Trans-
portation’s CAFE standards.17  The majority complained about the
EPA “shirk[ing] its environmental responsibilities” by failing to
make an “endangerment finding” regarding carbon dioxide.18  The
majority opinion also found the EPA Administrator failed to com-
they have to undergo a “fundamental redesign” until their state passes their own
standards. See infra notes 120-124 for further discussion of these standards.
11. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511 (discussing EPA shirking its responsibili-
ties of regulating GHGs).
12. See id. at 511 (providing that at time, the EPA did not believe it had statu-
tory authority to do so).
13. See id. (discussing appeal); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (providing CAA
section that requires EPA administrator to make such findings).
14. See Massachusetts, 433 F.3d at 514-15 (denying a petition for a hearing in
front of en banc panel).
15. See id. at 535 (reaching a holding requiring a case remand).
16. See id. at 514 (holding that carbon dioxide is an air pollutant).
17. See id. at 531–32 (highlighting how motor vehicles follow their own GHG
emission standards).
18. See id. (detailing how EPA avoided taking responsibility).  “The two obliga-
tions may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both
administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.” Id. at 32.
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ply with the CAA requirements, because clear evidence supported
making an endangerment finding on carbon dioxide.19  The Court
resolved the EPA’s dispute over its CAA authority using Chevron’s
two-step framework, stopping after the first step because the CAA
was “unambiguous” requiring the EPA to regulate dangerous pollu-
tants.20  The Majority finally required the EPA to determine
whether carbon dioxide actually endangers public welfare.21
As a result of this Supreme Court holding, the EPA took its first
steps in combating GHG emissions by making an endangerment
finding on carbon dioxide.22  The EPA endangerment finding on
carbon dioxide has subsequently been challenged in the D.C. Cir-
cuit, and the court upheld the EPA’s conclusion; noting that car-
bon dioxide emissions “may reasonably be anticipated both to
endanger public health and to endanger public welfare.”23  Follow-
ing the D.C. Circuit’s challenges to the EPA’s endangerment find-
ing on carbon dioxide, questions remained regarding the scope of
the EPA’s duties under the CAA and whether CAA section 202 re-
quires the EPA to interpret the term “air pollutant” for all other
CAA provisions.  The Supreme Court partially answered this ques-
tion in American Electric Producers v. EPA, and subsequently provided
greater detail in United Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.
B. American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut Displaces the Right of
Private Citizens to Bring Federal Common Law Claims
Three years after Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held
in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut that federal common law
does not give citizens the right to sue corporations for emitting
19. See id. (providing EPA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious).  In short,
the EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether
greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change.  Its action was therefore
“arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(d)(9)(A).” Id. at 34.
20. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res.s Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984) (providing basis for how Court analyzes agency statutory questions).
Under Chevron, the Court determines first whether the statute is ambiguous. If,
and only if, the statute is ambiguous, the Court then asks whether the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable. Id.
21. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534 (providing under Chevron, EPA has to
determine whether carbon dioxide actually endangers public welfare).
22. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under
Section 202(a) of the CAA, EPA, www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/ (last
visited on Dec. 10, 2015) (finding that GHGs endanger public health and welfare).
23. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 122-23
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining how Supreme Court denied petitions for writ of certi-
orari challenging EPA’s CAA section 202 endangerment finding).
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GHGs.24  In this case, a unanimous Supreme Court reasoned that
the CAA delegates all GHG emissions management to the EPA.25
To provide some context, American Electric Power Co. v. Connecti-
cut’s story starts in 2004 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.26  The case’s litigants brought the
first public nuisance claim for global warming, but the S.D.N.Y.
court dismissed the suit finding federal common law claims as “non-
justiciable” under the political question doctrine (the doctrine that
Congress, and not courts are better suited to handle controversial
subjects like these).27  The Second Circuit, however, disagreed
holding that plaintiffs in the case had sufficiently pled Article III
standing and could bring the claim.28
To resolve this dispute, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
and held that only the EPA has the authority to issue emissions reg-
ulations.29  The Court also held the EPA’s authority displaces any
federal common law right to any claims that may have existed.30
Justice Ginsberg’s majority opinion stated  “[i]t is altogether fitting
that Congress designated an expert agency, here, the EPA, as best
suited to serve as primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions.”31
The majority opinion also contemplated the EPA’s authority for
GHG regulation primarily under CAA section 111(d).32  While the
Supreme Court has never explicitly found statutory authority for
the EPA to regulate GHG emissions under CAA section 111(d), the
Court recently decided a case that previews how they might decide.
24. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2010) (holding citi-
zens have no right to sue corporations emitting GHGs).
25. See id. at 2539 (holding EPA retains exclusive rights to regulate GHG
emissions).
26. See id. at 2533 (discussing procedural results case).
27. See id. at 2534 (providing district court’s reasoning for dismissing suit).
28. See id. (explaining how case eventually made it up Supreme Court).
29. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539 (“The Clean Air Act entrusts such
complex balancing to EPA in the first instance.”).
30. See id. at 2537 (holding that a claim of nuisance was “displaced by federal
legislation authorizing EPA to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions.”).
31. See id. at 2539 (highlighting Justice Ginsberg mentioning EPA is perfectly
designed for job).
32. See id. at 2527, 2537–38 (referencing CAA 111(b) and 111(d) as examples
of where the EPA is entrusted to deal with decisions regarding pollutants, includ-
ing GHGs).
5
Waltman: Assessing the EPA's Authority to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emission
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
40 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII: p. 35
C. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection and the
Meanings of Air Pollutants
On January 2, 2011, the EPA promulgated new regulations ap-
plicable to all stationary sources of GHGs under its CAA authority.33
In issuing these regulations, the EPA planned to tailor its programs
based on GHGs, rather than specific GHG outputs so the new regu-
lations reached more than “a relatively small number of large indus-
trial sources.”34
In response to these new EPA regulations, a number of states
and industrial groups petitioned the D.C. Circuit for administrative
writ.35  The petitioners challenged: (1) the EPA’s determination
that GHGs may “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare”; (2) the agency’s GHG emissions standards for
cars and light trucks; and (3) the Title V and section 108 stationary
source regulations.36  The D.C. Circuit upheld: (1) the EPA’s “En-
dangerment Finding” and the section 108 “Best Available Control
Technology” (BACT) standards for Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration (PSD) permittees; (2) found that the CAA compelled the
EPA to apply PSD permitting requirements to GHGs as “any regu-
lated air pollutant”; and (3) held that the petitioners lacked Article
III standing to challenge the PSD and Title V Triggering and Tai-
loring Rules.37  The D.C. Circuit also denied the plaintiffs’ petition
for a rehearing en banc.38
On June 23, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
only one issue: “[w]hether the EPA permissibly determined that its
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for sta-
33. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51,
70, and 71) [hereinafter the Tailoring Rule] (codifying EPA’s new tailoring rule).
34. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 33 (discussing EPA’s new thought processes
behind tailoring rule).
35. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., 684 F.3d at 113 (providing a
case where plaintiff’s challenged EPA’s new regulations).
36. See id. at 113 (citing different reasons petitioners challenged the EPA’s
conclusions).
37. See id. at 119, 126, 137 (upholding EPA’s “Endangerment Finding” and
section 108 “Best Available Control Technology” (BACT) standards for PSD per-
mittees); see also id. at 133–34 (finding that CAA compelled EPA to apply PSD
permitting requirement to GHGs as “any regulated air pollutant”); see also id. at
136 (holding that petitioners lacked standing).
38. See No. 09-1322 (Dec. 20, 2012), available at 2012 WL 6621785 (denying
the petitioners rehearing en banc).
6
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol27/iss1/2
2016] ASSESSING THE EPA’S AUTHORITY 41
tionary sources that emit greenhouse gas.”39  The Court first de-
cided the EPA impermissibly “determined that a source may be
subject to the PSD and Title V permitting requirements on the sole
basis of the source’s potential to emit greenhouse gases.”40  Next,
the Court held that the “EPA permissibly determined that a source
already subject to the PSD program because of its emission of con-
ventional pollutants . . . may be required to limit its [GHG] emis-
sions by employing the [BACT] for [GHGs].”41
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in the case focused on the
CAA’s statutory language and its parameters for “triggering” the
CAA’s permitting requirements.42  The CAA as a statute requires
states to undergo a PSD permitting process for stationary sources
that have “the potential to emit 250 tons per year of any air pollu-
tant,” with a lesser limit of “100 tons per year” for specified sources
under Title V.43  The EPA contended that GHG emissions tend to
be much stronger and broader than conventional pollutant emis-
sions, which therefore should extend the EPA’s CAA jurisdiction to
“numerous small sources not previously regulated under the
Act.”44  The Court, however, disagreed with the EPA extending its
CAA authority and held that the EPA’s actions violated Chevron be-
cause the agency tailored its “bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting
unambiguous statutory terms.”45  The Court also held that even if
the CAA’s permitting provisions’ were ambiguous, the EPA unrea-
sonably interpreted the Act because it allowed a regulatory reset of
39. See Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2438 (detailing the question the
court would resolve).
40. See id. (providing that not all GHG emitting sources can be subject to
permitting requirements).  The statutory language provides otherwise. Id.
41. See id. (holding EPA may use BACT standards to limit GHGs from all
sources).
42. See id. at 2437 (discussing numeric thresholds of 100 tons per year and 250
tons per year under Title V and PSD programs).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (showing EPA’s statutorily required permitting
processes).
44. See 75 Fed. Reg. 44,355 (determining that GHG output is usually “orders
of magnitude” greater than output of conventional pollutants); see also Util. Air
Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2438 (agreeing with EPA that regulating GHGs using
same numeric thresholds for GHGs as for other criteria pollutants would dramati-
cally increase EPA’s reach to emitting facilities).  The EPA projected that the per-
mit requirement would extend to “smaller industrial sources, large office and
residential buildings, hotels, large retail establishments, and similar facilities.” See
75 Fed. Reg. 444908, 44499 (discussing expansion of permitting programs).  This
expansion, according to EPA estimates, would remain “relatively ineffective at re-
ducing greenhouse gas concentrations.” Id.
45. See Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2445 (finding a violation of Chev-
ron, step one).
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the statutory thresholds for air pollutants.46  In making these overly
broad interpretations, the Court found the EPA failed to resolve
any ambiguity “within the bounds of its statutory authority.”47
The majority also held the EPA went too far because the CAA’s
statutory language already refers to certain pollutants.48  The Court
held, in trying to cater the permitting triggers to reasonably apply
to GHGs, the EPA ignored the CAA’s specific numeric thresholds.49
The Court also held that including GHGs in the definition of “any
air pollutant” would “radically expand those [permitting] pro-
grams, making them both unadministrable and unrecognizable to
the Congress that designed them.”50  Therefore, under the Court’s
reasoning, if an entity is not otherwise subject to PSD or Title V
permits based on the CAA’s six enumerated “criteria pollutants,”
the EPA has no authority to affect its GHG output through use of
permits.51  Alternatively, sources already subject to PSD or Title V
permitting requirements—or “anyway” sources—are properly sub-
ject to the EPA’s BACT state guidelines.52
For parties seeking insight into how the Court will analyze fu-
ture CAA regulations, the Court discussed that regulation of GHGs
through BACT state guidelines is proper because “the text of the
BACT provision is far less open-ended than the text of the PSD and
Title V permitting triggers.”53  Moreover, the Court found BACT
more appropriate for regulating GHG emissions from “anyway”
sources because: (1) BACT requirements cannot demand a “funda-
46. See id. at 2438 (noting EPA’s unreasonable interpretation of its guiding
statutory authority). The language of the Administrative Procedure Act prompts
courts to analyze whether the agency decision is “arbitrary and capricious” in sec-
tion 706(2)(A). Id.  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, conceded, “[t]o be
sure, Congress’s profligate use of “air pollutant” where what it meant is obviously
narrower than the Act-wide definition is not conducive to clarity.” Id. at 2441.
47. See id. (citing City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (discussing
an overly broad statutory interpretation under Chevron).
48. See id. at 2438 (holding that statutory language did not allow EPA to go
this far).
49. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 33 (setting regulatory thresholds for GHGs
that conflict with those criteria pollutants in Title V and PSD permitting).
50. See Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2438 (providing that Congress
did not want the EPA to expand its permitting authority).
51. See id. (discussing EPA’s limited permitting authority).
52. See id. (emphasizing that these “anyway” sources comprise 83 percent of
all GHG emissions).  Non-“anyway” stationary sources make up only three percent
of total GHG emissions. Id.
53. See § 7475(a)(4) (providing a different basis for how Court will analyze
CAA regulations).  The Clean Air Act states that BACT is required “for each pollu-
tant subject to regulation under this chapter [the entire Act].” Id.  In contrast to
automatic thresholds for PSD and Title V permits, BACT gives states discretion
over which sources to regulate. Id.
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mental redesign” of facilities; (2) the EPA has long interpreted
BACT so as to consider “whether a proposed regulatory burden
outweighs any reduction in emissions to be achieved”; and (3) regu-
lations of GHGs through BACT requirements are “not so disas-
trously unworkable” so as to result in “a dramatic expansion of
agency authority.54  For these reasons, the Court held the EPA’s in-
terpretation of its authority to regulate GHGs though its BACT
standards was reasonable.55
The Court in UARG v. EPA assessed the EPA finding statutory
authority to regulate GHGs based upon the CAA’s text, statutory
history, regulatory concerns, and practical effects.56  Specifically,
the Court first addressed the CAA’s PSD and Title V provisions and
found they gave the EPA no authority to regulate GHGs as a result
of the triggering language considered through the legislative his-
tory.57  The Court next contrasted the CAA’s impermissible section
108 and Title V permit regulations with the permissible BACT GHG
regulations by considering their practical differences based on
their: (1) burdens to facilities; (2) extent of the EPA and state regu-
latory burden compared to expected regulatory benefits; (3) and
administrative viability.58  Following UARG v. EPA, any serious legal
practitioner addressing the EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs
should follow the majority’s analytical approach.59
54. See Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2448 (providing Court’s discus-
sion of the EPA’s statutory authority).  “We are not talking about extending EPA
jurisdiction over millions of previously unregulated entities, but about moderately
increasing the demands [on those] already subject to regulation.” Id.
55. Id. (holding EPA’s interpretation of its statutory authority was
permissible).
56. See supra notes 42–55 and accompanying text for Supreme Court’s discus-
sion of CAA’s statutory history, regulatory concerns, and practical effects.
57. See supra notes 42–49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title V
and Section 108 language.
58. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practi-
cal effects of BACT standards versus Title V and PSD standards.
59. See Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363,
368 (2007) (“Decisions under statutes may be treated to a stricter doctrine of pre-
cedent because legislative correction is simple and readily available”).  At the very
least, plans that don’t require “fundamental redesigns,” include cost benefit analy-
sis, and don’t drastically increase the number of regulated facilities, will be more
likely to survive judicial scrutiny. Id.
9
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III. EPA’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE GHGS
UNDER CAA SECTION 111(D)
In 1970, Congress enacted CAA section 111(d) as a “backstop”
to catch any pollution the Act does not otherwise target.60  Under
section 111(b), the EPA sets pollution standards for a category
of new sources that it finds “significantly contribute” to air pollution
that “endangers public health or welfare.”61  Then, the EPA sets
guidelines under section 111(d) for unregulated pollution from ex-
isting sources in that same category.62  CAA section 111 also re-
quires states to implement enforceable standards and “adequately
demonstrate” their equivalence to “the best system of emissions re-
duction” (BSER), as determined by the EPA Administrator.63  Sec-
tion 111(d) is also a viable source of statutory authority permitting
the EPA to regulate stationary sources of GHGs because the EPA
can reasonably read section 111(d) to apply broadly to existing
sources of GHGs and, section 111 is a reasonable choice for regulat-
ing stationary sources of existing GHGs in an efficient, effective,
and flexible way.64
60. See Kate Konschnik, EPA’s 111(d) Authority - Follow Homer and Avoid the Si-
rens, LEGAL PLANET (May 28, 2014), legal-planet.org/2014/05/28/guest-blogger-
kate-konschnik-epas-111d-authority-follow-homer-and-avoid-the-sirens/ (providing
that section 111 may give the EPA authority to regulate pollutants that are neither
regulated as criteria pollutants under section 108(a) nor as hazardous air pollu-
tants (HAPs) under section 112 of the Act).
61. See CAA § 111(b)(1)(A) (providing relevant statutory language).  Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court in Massachusetts and UARG, this same language allows
the EPA to regulate GHGs under CAA section 202.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 4711 (d) (1970) (displaying the basis for EPA’s guide-
lines); see also Konschnik, supra note 60 (discussing framework of CAA section 111,
where subsection (b) addresses regulation of new sources and subsection (d) in-
volves same for existing sources).
63. See CAA § 111(a)(1) (providing that states have an important role).
Under section 111(c), states are free to propose plans to implement and enforce
the new source standards created by EPA.  42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (noting Administra-
tor should prescribe regulations of motor vehicle emissions that endanger public
health or welfare).
64. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537–38 (holding that section 111,
including section 111(d), applies to carbon dioxide emissions from those sources).
Further, there is broad agreement among legal academia and industry experts that
the EPA can effectively curb GHG emissions under section 111 of the Act.  See
Gregory E. Wannier, et al., Prevailing Academic View on Compliance Flexibility under
section 111 of the CAA, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (July 2011), www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-DP-11-29.pdf (discussing almost unanimous consensus that sec-
tion 111 is EPA’s key to regulating stationary GHG sources).
10
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A. The EPA Can Reasonably Interpret the Text of Section
111(d) to Apply to GHG Sources
The Supreme Court allowed the EPA to regulate GHGs under
CAA section 202.  The Court will likely allow the EPA to regulate
GHGs under section 111’s almost identical language.65  The Senate
and House of Representatives conflicting versions of section 111
will not likely render either interpretation unreasonable.66
1. Section 111(b)’s prompting language is the same broad statutory
language as section 202
Section 111(b)(1)(A) prompts the EPA Administrator to regu-
late a category of sources under section 111(d) if, “in his [or her]
judgment [it] causes, or contributes significantly to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.”67  In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that
the EPA could reasonably interpret similar language under section
202—“[t]he Administrator shall . . . prescribe . . . standards applica-
ble to the emission of any air pollutant . . . which in his judgment
cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may be reasonably anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare”—to include GHGs.68  Because this
CAA statute-wide definition of “air pollutant” is “unambiguous” in
including chemical species such as CO2, and because the EPA has
determined that GHGs may “reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare,” the EPA has reasonable statutory author-
ity to regulate existing stationary sources of GHG emission under
section 111(b).69  However, the statute does have one exclusion
that causes some ambiguity related to the EPA’s authority.
65. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497 (requiring EPA to determine whether
GHGs endanger human health and public safety, and, if so, to regulate them
under CAA Section 202).
66. See infra notes 70-87 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the
House and Senate versions of the 1990 CAA Section 111 amendments.
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(1)(A) (providing statutory authority for EPA to
regulate dangerous air pollution).
68. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (emphasis
added)). “On the merits, the first question is whether § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air
Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
in the event that it forms a “judgment” that such emissions contribute to climate
change. Id.  We have little trouble concluding that it does.” Id.  This holding was
essentially reaffirmed in Util. Air Regulatory Group, where the Court let stand a D.C.
Circuit Judgment upholding EPA GHG regulations under section 202. Util. Air
Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2427.
69. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529 (including CO2 and GHGs in its discus-
sion of CAA’s “sweeping” definition of “air pollutant”). See also Endangerment and
Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the CAA, EPA,
EPA, available at www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/ (last visited on Oct.
11
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2. The EPA can reasonably resolve the ambiguity resulting from the
1990 CAA amendment in favor of including GHG
sources for section 111(d) programs
In 1990, Congress amended the CAA to add permitting pro-
grams and revise existing clean air programs.70  Congress’ 1990
changes to section 111(d) reference pollutants under section 112’s
Hazardous Air Pollutant (HAP) permitting program.71  Congress’s
changes to section 111(d) vary between the House and Senate, but
each version still holds the force of law.72  Under the Senate ver-
sion, the section 111(d) process applies to “any air pollutant not
included on a list published under . . . 112(b).”73  In contrast, the
House version requires rulemaking for “any air pollutant . . . not
emitted from a source category which is regulated under Section
112.”74  Critics focus their attention on the ambiguous language of
the House version with some finding that it prohibits section
111(d) regulation of any source regulated under Section 112.75
Congress never discussed this slight discrepancy between the Sen-
ate and House versions in its committee hearings, floor debates, or
in conference.76  Finally, while the non-controlling U.S. Code in-
cludes only the House version, the controlling Statutes at Large in-
clude both versions.77
Supporters of GHG regulation under section 111(d) argue
that the Senate version should govern because it follows the House
19, 2014) (describing EPA’s basis for finding that GHGs endanger public health
and welfare).  The Act may require EPA to regulate GHGs. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(d)(1) (“The Administrator shall prescribe regulations which shall establish
a procedure similar to that provided by section 110.”).
70. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 104 Stat. 2468, P.L. 101-549
(showing the statutory ambiguity).
71. See id. (highlighting Congress’ references to 112’s pollutants); see also Avi
Zevin, Dueling Amendments: The Applicability of Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act to
Greenhouse Gases, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY (Nov. 11, 2014), available at policy-
integrity.org/publications/detail/dueling-amendments/ (discussing language of
each amendment).
72. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 104 Stat. 2468, P.L. 101-549(“The
United States at Large shall be legal evidence of laws. . . .”); see also 1 U.S. Code
§ 112 (“The United States at Large shall be legal evidence of laws. . . .”).
73. See supra note 72 (providing Senate’s version of statutory language).
74. See id. (providing statutory language of House version).
75. See Zevin, supra note 71 (concluding that House version excludes entire
sources of HAPs, not just the HAPs emitted, from section 111 regulation).
76. See George Bush, Statement on Signing the Bill Amending the Clean Air Act,
(Nov. 15, 1990), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19039 (not-
ing lack of documented discussion surrounding passage of 1990 CAA amend-
ments); see also Zevin, supra note 71, at 30–34 (noting same).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 4711(d) (showing how U.S. Code annotation notes
discrepancy).
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version and it is in the Statutes at Large.78  In the absence of a
clearly articulated Congressional intent, to the extent the House
version conflicts with the Senate version, a presumption against im-
plied repeal applies.79  Because CAA section 111(d) has always af-
forded regulation of non-HAP pollutants from HAP emitting
sources, a change disallowing such regulations will require evidence
beyond a minor ambiguity.80
Opponents of section 111(d) GHG regulation emphasize that
only the House version appears in the U.S. Code, and that this ver-
sion excludes EGUs from regulation under section 111(d) if they
are subject to regulation under section 112.81  Accordingly, oppo-
nents urge that the Senate version contained in the Statutes at
Large is merely a drafting error, and should be given no legal
force.82  The EPA currently interprets section 111(d) to apply to
78. See Konschnik, supra note 60 (discussing “last in point of arrangement”
rule— “[T]he last provision in point of arrangement must control”).
79. See Konschnik, supra note 60 (discussing “last in point of arrangement”
rule— “[T]he last provision in point of arrangement must control.”) (citing Am.
Fed’n of Gov’t Emp.s v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).  Moreover, the
House version could also easily be read to comport with the Senate version. Id.
This interpretation would avoid drastically changing the meaning of Section
111(d) without any discussion or other showing of intent to do so by Congress. See
Kate Konschnik, Working Draft: Why EPA is not only Authorized but Required to Regulate
Toxic Pollutants and Greenhouse Gases from Existing Power Plants, Harv. L. School 12
(Nov. 2014), available at environment.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015
/08/regulating-existing-power-plants-clean-air-act-111d.pdf (discussing the pre-
sumption against implied repeal, and the fact that no discussions of repeal oc-
curred during the bill’s passage through committees and Congress). Another
proponent argument involves an analogy to section 109(a)(2), which calls for stan-
dards for incinerators using maximum available control technology (MACT). See
Dan Farber, Another Piece of the Section 111(d) Puzzle, LEGAL PLANET (Dec. 2, 2014),
legal-planet.org/2014/12/02/another-piece-of-the-section-111d-puzzle/ (consid-
ering section 111(d) similarities to section 109); see also Megan Ceronsky & Toma´s
Carbonell, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: The Legal Foundation for Strong, Flexible
& Cost-effective Carbon Pollution Standards for Existing Power Plants, ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE FUND (Oct. 2013), available at www.edf.org/sites/default/files/section-
111-d-of-the-clean-air-act_the-legal-foundation-for-strong-flexible-cost-effective-car
bon-pollution-standards-for-existing-power-plants.pdf (providing how 111(d) en-
ables EPA to take actions that it did in Clean Air Act).
80. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“[A court] may not substitute [their] own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by ad-
ministrator of an agency.”)
81. See William Yeatman, Primer: The Ongoing Controversy over Whether Clean Air
Act §111(d) Authorizes EPA’s Clean Power Plan, GLOBALWARMING.ORG (July 2, 2014),
www.globalwarming.org/2014/07/02/primer-the-ongoing-controversy-over-wheth
er-clean-air-act-§111d-authorizes-epas-clean-power-plan/ (arguing that House ver-
sion of 1990 CAA Section 111(d) amendment controls and that it precludes the
EPA from regulating HAP sources, not just pollutants, under section 111(d)).
82. See id. (“Logically, the adoption of the House language rendered moot
the Senate clerical language”).  “However, the Conference Committee failed to
remove the Senate’s conforming amendment.” Id.
13
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EGUs already regulated under section 112 for emission of HAPs,
provided that section 111(d) regulations do not target HAPs.83
In reviewing the EPA’s statutory interpretations similar to the
ones at issue in this instance, a court will defer to the agency inter-
preting ambiguous statutory language because a court “may not
substitute [their] own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.”84  The EPA has long interpreted  section 111(d)’s exclu-
sion for section 112(b) sources applies only to air pollutants
(HAPs) already regulated, not the entire source.85  The EPA em-
phasizes that excluding all section 112(b) EGUs from regulation
under section 111(d)
would be inconsistent with (i) Congress’ desire in the
1990 CAA Amendments to require the EPA to regulate
more substances, and (ii) the fact that the EPA has histori-
cally regulated non-hazardous air pollutants under section
111(d), even where those air pollutants were emitted from
a source category actually regulated under section 112.86
Whether the agency or its opponents are right, the EPA likely has
enough basis for a “reasonable” interpretation of ambiguous statu-
tory language under Chevron.87
83. See Legal Memorandum for Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for
Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, EPA (June 6, 2014), available at www2.epa.
gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602-legal-memorandum.
pdf (“Although EGUs are a source category that is regulated under CAA section
112, GHGs are not a HAP regulated under section 112.”).  “Therefore, the Section
112 exclusion in section 111(d) does not apply to GHGs, and 111(d) does not
preclude the EPA from establishing guidelines covering GHGs from EGUs.” Id.
84. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 865 (providing that courts should defer to an
agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language).
85. See Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous
Air Pollutants From Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and the Removal of Coal-and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units From the Section 112(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg.
15994, 16029-32 (March 29, 2005) (“Where a source category is regulated under
section 112, a section 111(d) standard of performance cannot be established to
address any HAP listed under section 112(b) that may be emitted from that partic-
ular source category.”).
86. See Memorandum for Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, supra note
83, at 26–27 (providing Congressional intent wants EPA to regulate ambiguous
statutory terms).
87. See Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2427 (deeming “reasonable”
EPA’s determination that the CAA allows GHG BACT standards when the CAA
language is ambiguous). In the same case, the Court rejected the “tailoring rule”
GHG regulations under PSD and Title V permits. See also Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmm’tys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding an agency inter-
pretation of “harm” in Endangered Species Act to include habitat modification
and degradation based mostly off of colloquial definition of word “harm”); see also
14
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3. Guidance from UARG v. EPA Supports Allowing Section
111(d) to Regulate GHGs because Section 111(d) requires
the EPA to Consider Economic Impacts and Requires
No Individual EGU Action
Although the Supreme Court has not stated the requirements
that would deem section 111(d) “reasonable,” the Court has left
some hints.88  In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, the Court
contemplated GHG regulation under section 111(d) holding that
EPA jurisdiction pursuant to the CAA displaced federal common
law suits.89  Moreover, the Court in UARG v. EPA differentiated be-
tween the EPA’s BACT GHG specifications for “anyway” sources
and the impermissible PSD and Title V GHG regulations based on:
(1) BACT requirements cannot demand “fundamental redesign” of
facilities; (2) EPA has long interpreted BACT so as to consider
“whether a proposed regulatory burden outweighs any reduction in
emissions to be achieved”; and (3) regulations of GHGs through
BACT requirements are “not so disastrously unworkable” so as to
result in “a dramatic expansion of agency authority.”90  As a result
of this ruling, lower courts will likely defer to the EPA including
GHGs under section 111(d) because it does not require individual
facilities to do anything specific, and instead requires the EPA to
consider costs and facility lifetime in setting BSERs.91
Section 111(d) regulations such as BACT standards, will not
directly require any facilities to undergo a “fundamental rede-
sign.”92  BACT standards will not require a fundamental redesign
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 (finding EPA creation of a “bubble” definition for regulat-
ing air pollutant emissions from individual emitters reasonable, although the CAA
did not explicitly call for a bubble method); see also Transmission Access Policy Study
Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding statutory interpretation
within FERC orders without explanation; court merely called for further explana-
tion on costs); see also Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 408 (5th
Cir. 1999) (deferring to agency’s interpretation of 1996 Telecommunications Act
when it replaced “the patchwork of explicit and implicit subsidies with ‘specific,
predictable and sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and advance
universal service”).
88. For a further discussion of these hints, see supra notes 11-59 and accompa-
nying text discussing Massachusetts, Am. Elec. Power Co., and Util. Air Regulatory
Group.
89. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537–38 (holding that EPA jurisdiction
displaced federal common law suits).
90. Id. “We are not talking about extending EPA jurisdiction over millions of
previously unregulated entities, but about moderately increasing the demands [on
those] already subject to regulation.” Id.
91. See infra notes 92–104 and accompanying text discussing how the EPA
must consider costs and facility lifetime in setting BSERs.
92. See Paul Hibbard, Andrea Okie, and Susan Tierney, EPA’s Clean Power
Plan: States’ Tools for Reducing Costs and Increasing Benefits to Consumers, ANALYSIS
15
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because BSERs take into account compliance costs, energy use,
physical constraints, geographic factors, and other differences be-
tween generating facilities.93  Adhering to these BACT standards,
states are then required to design their own implementation
plans.94  Any requirements for a fundamental redesign would in-
volve a state implementing its own “standards of performance”
rather than from any direct EPA action.
Section 111(d) regulations also provide a cost-benefit analysis
that determines “whether a proposed regulatory burden outweighs
any reduction in emissions to be achieved.”  For example, when the
EPA sets BSER under 111(d) it must take into “account the cost of
achieving such reduction.”95  In making these decisions, the EPA
also must consider the likelihood of achieving the reduction goals
in order to properly assess the “cost of achieving such reduction.”96
Under Section 111(d), the EPA has different regulatory options
that consider cost and feasibility in implementing standards as the
EPA Administrator must determine whether the standards are en-
forceable, economical, and technologically viable.97  If the EPA fol-
lows the textual requirements of section 111 in promulgating its
regulations, the agency will be deemed to have determined
“whether a proposed regulatory burden outweighs any reduction in
emissions to be achieved.”98
GROUP 4 (2014), available at www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/in
sights/publishing/analysis_group_epa_clean_power_plan_report.pdf (“[States]
will define the set of actions that will work together to reduce emissions from fossil
power plants.”).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (stating that BSER must “[take] into account
the cost of achieving such reduction and any non-air quality health and environ-
mental impact and energy requirements. . . .”); see also 40 C.F.R. § 60.22(b)(5)
(2007) (requiring consideration of cost of such reduction).  The regulations also
require the agency to consider the “time within which compliance with emission
standards of equivalent stringency can be achieved,” different “sizes, types and clas-
ses” of facilities, “geographical location,” and “physical limitations.” Id.; see also
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1981) rev’d, 463 U.S. 680 (1983),
(“After EPA makes this [achievability] determination, it must exercise its discretion
to choose an achievable emission level which represents the best balance of eco-
nomic, environmental, and energy considerations.”).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (mandating states determine their own plans).
This Act also enables states to consider “the remaining useful life of the existing
source.” Id.
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (requiring EPA to consider costs in any plan it
promotes).
96. See id.  (requiring EPA to consider feasibility of goals in considering plan’s
overall cost).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)(1)–(2) (detailing EPA’s statutory authority and
considerations it must take into account).
98. See Clean Power Plan Fact Sheet, supra note 7 (stating Clean Power Plan’s
public health and climate benefits).  These benefits are worth an estimated $55
16
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Lastly, the EPA is unlikely to “dramatically expand” its author-
ity if it regulates GHGs under section 111(d).99  By giving states the
flexibility to reduce GHG emissions based on their individual en-
ergy infrastructure, the EPA’s section 111 regulations can easily be
applied to target only facilities and EGUs already subject to CAA
regulation for some other pollutant(s).100  If the EPA wanted, it
could dramatically increase its jurisdiction by setting performance
standards especially high for GHGs and invoking its power to “pre-
scribe” and “enforce” state plans when states fail to do so.101  The
EPA, however, is unlikely to dramatically expand its power and use
section 111(d) to reach sources it wanted to avoid under its PSD
and Title V “tailoring rule” and because the EPA’s power to pre-
scribe or enforce implementation plans is contingent on each state
failing to do so.102  Predictions about the EPA’s decisions related to
its power, however, are speculative and should not serve as a basis to
preclude the EPA from using section 111(d) authority to regulate
GHGs.103  Legal and policy experts must, therefore, wait until the
rulemaking and state implementation stages to determine whether
there is a “dramatic” expansion of EPA authority.104
Over the years, legal and policy experts have proposed a range
of regulatory alternatives for targeting GHGs with section 111(d),
billion to $93 billion per year in 2030, far outweighing the costs of implementa-
tion. Id.
99. See Letter from Thomas Carbonell, EDF DIRECTOR OF REGULATORY POLICY
(2015), available at https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content /cleanpower-
plan_strong_legal_ foundation.pdf (providing EPA power to regulate pollution
under its statutory authority).  “This conclusion was, in fact, stated before the Su-
preme Court by attorneys for some of the nation’s largest power companies – who
declared unequivocally at oral argument that EPA has authority to regulate carbon
pollution from the power sector under section 111(d). . . .” Id.
100. Compare CAA Section 111(d)’s command to Title V Section 108 at issue
in Util. Air Regulatory Group, where states were told which plants at which threshold
of emissions to regulate. Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2437 (discussing
“250 ton per year” and “100 ton per year” emission thresholds under 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401 et seq.).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2)(A)–(B) (providing EPA statutory authority).
102. See Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2437 (discussing EPA’s use of
“Tailoring Rule” to avoid statute’s explicit emission threshold for sources and re-
sulting expansion of EPA’s authority over specific facilities that it did not previ-
ously have authority over).  Here, the EPA has no statutory authority over any
specific facilities as states determine how to reach BSER equivalency. Id.
103. See Florida State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1161
(11th Cir. 2008) (discussing how to have standing).  Courts generally require a
plaintiff to have a “substantially probable” injury, or an “immediate” injury. Id.; see
also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107-10 (1983) (declining to hear an
allegation of injury from future enforcement).
104. See Clean Power Plan—Technical Summary for States, EPA (2015), available at
www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/technical-summary-for-states.pdf (providing
that EPA only sets BSER, and “states choose how they will meet it.”).
17
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including cap-and-trade programs, direct system-wide require-
ments, extended emissions averaging, and facility-specific emis-
sions-rate standards.105  The experts’ regulatory proposals have
included these tools along with many other emission reduction
strategies.106  The Clean Power Plan is the EPA’s first attempt to
regulate GHGs using CAA section 111(d).107
B. The EPA’s Clean Power Plan
The EPA’s Final Clean Power Plan aims to reduce GHG output
from existing power plants.108  Citing both the Obama Administra-
tion’s stated goal of addressing climate change and the scientific
communities consensus linking elevated GHG concentrations to cli-
mate change, the EPA is taking its first steps toward regulating car-
bon emissions from existing stationary sources pursuant to its
statutory authority under section 111(d) of the CAA.109  The EPA
105. See EPA Attempts “Outside the Fence” Carbon Emissions Standards, TAU TECH-
NICAL COMMUNICATIONS LLC (June 2, 2014), www.tautechnical.com/?p=1036
(comparing “inside the fence” to “outside the fence” approaches).  “Inside the
fence” plans focus only on reductions standards for individual power plants,
whereas “outside the fence” approaches allow for accounting of emissions reduc-
tions through efficiency measures and reductions outside of the facility’s control.
Id.; see also Jeremy M. Tarr, Jonas Montast, and Tim Profeta, Regulating Carbon Diox-
ide under Section 111(d) of the CAA: Options, Limits, and Impacts, NICHOLAS INSTITUTE
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SOLUTIONS 7 (Jan. 2013), available at nicholasinstitute
.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/regulating-carbon-dioxide-under-section-111d#.
VETvmvnFSo (discussing, among other things, carbon taxes and emissions trad-
ing); see also Dallas Burtraw et al., Retail Electricity Price Savings from Compliance Flexi-
bility in Greenhouse Gas Standards for Stationary Sources, 42 ENERGY POL’Y 67, 68–69
(2012) (discussing several options for reducing emissions on site at coal-fired
plants).
106. See infra notes 109-157 and accompanying text (providing specifics on
the Clean Power Plan’s regulations). See also Conrad Schneider, Power Switch: An
Effective, Affordable Approach to Reducing Carbon Pollution from Existing Fossil-Fueled
Power Plants, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE 3, 10–12 (Feb. 2014), available at www.catf.us/
resources/publications/files/Power_Switch.pdf (advocating for “fuel switching”—
for coal burning power plants to undergo retrofitting to switch from coal to natu-
ral gas as a source for production, switching their fuel source entirely from coal to
natural gas).
107. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6 (providing Clean Power Plan’s statu-
tory authority).
108. See id. (discussing goals to reduce US carbon emissions).
109. See Executive Office of the President: The President’s Climate Action Plan, THE
WHITEHOUSE (June 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/
president27sclimateactionplan.pdf (addressing Obama Administration’s commit-
ment to GHG reductions, and calling for promulgation of Clean Power Plan); see
also Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, IPCC, http://www.climate
change2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf (last visited Oct. 18,
2014) (“It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause
of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.”); see also Peter Folger, The
Carbon Cycle: Implications for Climate Change and Congress, CRS Report RL34059 (not-
18
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estimates that the Plan can reduce emissions from EGUs by thirty-
two percent by 2030 as compared to 2005 rates.110
1. The Clean Power Plan Outlined
The Clean Power Plan sets emission guidelines for states to fol-
low in developing their own plans to address GHG emissions from
existing fossil fuel-fired EGUs.111  Under the Plan, each state re-
ceives its own rate-based goals for power sector carbon emissions
based on the state’s current power portfolio and recent progress
toward reducing emissions.112  The Plan also affords states flexibil-
ity in choosing strategies to meet their GHG reduction objectives in
the least burdensome manner—whether individually or through
combined efforts with a regional or multi-state plan.113  So as states
develop plans to achieve GHG reduction goals from 2022-2029, the
Plan provides three “building blocks,” or optional regulatory tools,
to demonstrate BSER: (1) efficiency improvements in fossil-fuel
power production; (2) prioritization of lower emitting power plants
to keep dirty plants offline as much as appropriate; and (3) reduc-
tion credits for “zero emitting” renewable energy sources.114
ing “As the CO2 concentration grows, it increases the degree to which the atmos-
phere traps incoming radiation from the sun, which further warms the planet”).
110. See Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule, ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ES-8 (Aug. 3, 2015), available at www2.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf (“[U]nder the rate-
based approach, CO2 emission reductions increase to 871 million short tons (32
percent) in 2030 when compared to 2005 levels.”).
111. See supra notes 60-108 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
the EPA’s identified “best system of emission reductions.”
112. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 10 (demonstrating that under
Clean Power Plan, states can opt to set their goals in terms of mass).  Under the
same plan, states can also wait for the EPA to publish mass-based goals, instead of
expressing output as a ratio of GHG tons to kWhr produced by default. Id.
113. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 24 (“Each state can do so on its
own, or a state can collaborate with other states and/or tribal governments on
multi-state plans, or states can include in their plans the trading tools that EGUs
can use to realize additional opportunities for cost savings while continuing to
operate across the interstate system through which electricity is produced.”).
114. See id. at 27, 230 (“In this final action, the agency has determined that
the BSER comprises the first three of the four proposed “building blocks,” with
certain refinements to the three building blocks.”). Id.  “Building block one in-
cludes operational improvements and equipment upgrades that the coal fired
steam-generating EGUs in the state may undertake to improve their heat rate.” Id.
It qualifies as part of the BSER because it improves the carbon intensity of the
affected EGUs in generating electricity through actions the affected sources may
undertake that are adequately demonstrated and whose cost is “reasonable.” See
Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 238 (discussing BSER requirements).  For a
state to show compliance through building block two,
the owner/operator of a steam EGU may increase generation at an ex-
isting NGCC unit it already owns, or one that it purchases or invests in.
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2. Supply-side efficiency improvement for coal-fired EGUs
The EPA expects that major CO2 emissions reductions can re-
sult from inexpensive efficiency gains at the dirtiest power plants
through heat-rate improvements in coal-fired power plants.115  The
EPA estimates that states can realize efficiency gains of 2.1 to 6.9
percent simply by adopting best practices for coal-fired EGUs.116
The EPA and proponents of these supply-side efficiencies empha-
size that heat rate improvements pay for themselves.117  The agency
believes heat rate improvements pay for themselves because their
costs are at least partially counteracted because they reduce fuel
costs per unit of power.118  The agency believes strongly in these
supply-side efficiencies, but opponents are concerned that certain
In addition, the owner/operator may, through a bilateral transaction
with an existing NGCC unit, pay the unit to increase generation, and ac-
quire the CO2-reducing effects of that increased generation in the form
of a credit.  Building block three is a ‘system of emission reduction’ for all
affected EGUs because incremental [renewable energy] generation will
result in reduced generation and emissions from affected EGUs, and
owners or operators of affected EGUs can apply or implement building
block three through a number of actions.
Id.  “For example, they can invest in incremental [renewable energy] generation
either directly or through the purchase of [renewable energy credits].” Id. at 437.
The proposed 2014 plan included a fourth building block that called for use of
demand-side energy efficiency measures, but this fourth building block was elimi-
nated due to difficulties with quantifying the benefits realized from such efficiency
measures. See EPA Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34829, at 34835 (2014)
[hereinafter Proposed Clean Power Plan].
115. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 238; Key Changes and Improvements,
supra note 6, at 3 (indicating EPA expects that states can implement heat rate
improvements to reduce GHG emissions by 2.1 percent to 4.3 percent at existing
coal-fired power plants).
116. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 660–61 (emphasizing states poten-
tial efficiency gains).  In this same section of the Clean Power Plan, see table 6 for a
breakdown of heat rate improvements by region over a two-year averaging period.
Id.  The Proposed Clean Power Plan assumed an overall average of six percent
efficiency improvements for coal and oil fired plants, but the EPA changed its
calculation after the comment period. See Key Changes and Improvements, supra note
6, at 3 (noting the change in expectations for heat rate efficiency improvements
for coal fired power plants).
117. See Kambaladinne, Rajesh, Heat Rate Reduction in Thermal Power Generation
Plants Leveraging ‘Big Data/Analytics’ Solutions, ENERGY CENTRAL (Aug. 5, 2015),
www.energycentral.com/generationstorage/futureandalternativegeneration/arti
cles/3220/Heat-rate-reduction-in-thermal-power-generation-plants-leveraging-Big-
Data-Analytics-solutions (discussing how improving a power plant’s heat rate can
“significantly lower fuel consumption”).
118. See Analysis of Heat Rate Improvement Potential at Coal-Fired Power Plants,
U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (May 19, 2015), www.eia.gov/analysis/
studies/powerplants/heatrate/ (assessing lowered fuel costs, cost of compliance,
and other costs associated with heat rate improvements).
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states will rely on them too much to the point that they will require
expensive equipment upgrades.119
3. Environmental Dispatch—prioritizing power generation from
clean sources
The EPA’s second “building block” encourages states to use
lower-emitting power plants to meet energy demand.120  This EPA
recommendation is very expensive because most power plants cur-
rently dispatch based on their price, and fossil fuel based power is
cheapest.121  The Clean Power Plan, conversely, proposes that states
prioritize the use of more expensive and higher efficiency natural
gas combined cycle (NGCC) units over dirtier coal-fired or oil-fired
power plants.122  The EPA established this BSER assuming that, on
average, states can dispatch existing and under-construction NGCC
EGUs at seventy-five percent “net summer capacity,” and estimates
that this will result in lower carbon and co-pollutant emissions na-
tionally.123  The EPA’s primary opponents argue these recommen-
dations could compromise state grid reliability and additionally,
some states’ anticipated power mixes have no room for additional
natural gas.124
119. See Wesley Brown, Gov.-elect Hutchinson pushes back against EPA’s Clean
Power Plan, THE CITY WIRE (Dec. 3, 2014), www.thecitywire.com/node/
35691#.VhXvQ3pVikp (offering example of a state lawmaker pushing back against
the Clean Power Plan).  “For example, Duane Highley, President and CEO of Ar-
kansas Electric Cooperatives Corp., stated publicly that the EPA’s proposal should
be delayed because it could shut down the state’s coal-powered power plants,
which supply more than 53% of the state’s electricity demand.” Id.; see also infra
notes 135-157 and accompanying text for a further discussion of points of conflict
surrounding the Clean Power Plan.
120. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 315 (providing second building
block of Clean Power Plan).
121. See FERC Staff, Economic Dispatch: Concepts, Practices and Issues, FEDERAL
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (Nov. 13, 2005), available at http://www.ferc
.gov/eventcalendar/Files/20051110172953-FERC%20Staff%20Presentation.pdf
(noting that, generally, electricity is procured from where it is most cheaply
available).
122. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 315 (proposing states prioritize use
of higher efficiency, natural gas production).
123. See id. at 704, 711 (providing basis of determining BSER).  The “net sum-
mer capacity” is determined by the maximum actual performance of a power plant
at its respective point of interconnection on the electric grid during the summer
months. See What is the Difference Between Electricity Generation Capacity and Electricity
Generation, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 30, 2015),
www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=101&t=3 (explaining difference between elec-
tric generation capacity and electric generation).
124. See Jean Chemnick and Emily Holden, Clean Power Plan Ratchets up Bur-
dens on Coal States, ENERGY WIRE (Aug. 12, 2015), www.eenews.net/stories/106002
3333 (noting discrepancy between state BSER goals, and difficulty that coal states
will face in complying).
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4. Expansion of zero and low-emitting EGU capacity
The Clean Power Plan’s third “building block,” encourages
states to expand generating capacity to renewable and low-emitting
sources such as solar, geothermal, and wind.125  The Plan empha-
sizes that states using more generation from these low or non-emit-
ting sources will reduce the required output from higher emitting
sources, and will reduce the electric system’s overall emissions.126
Even without this Clean Power Plan initiative, the nation’s commit-
ment to renewable sources is promising because “[m]any affected
EGUs are already planning on deploying significant amounts of [re-
newable energy].”127  The Final Clean Power Plan reflects this com-
mitment by including more use of renewable energy than the
proposed plan reasoning that “recent reductions in the cost of
clean energy technology, as well as projections of continuing cost
reductions,” justify the commitment to renewables.128  Under the
Proposed Clean Power Plan, the EPA estimated that renewable en-
ergy would constitute twenty-two percent of total nationwide energy
production by 2030.129  Under the Final Clean Power Plan, the EPA
estimates that renewable energy will constitute twenty-eight percent
of total nationwide energy production by 2030.130
Remember, however, that the Clean Power Plan’s building
blocks are not mandatory so state plans might include any, all, or
none of the building blocks and states might also implement strate-
gies and technologies not discussed in the Clean Power Plan.131  In
125. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 436 (highlighting Clean Power
Plan’s emphasis on renewables).  The 2014 Proposed Clean Power Plan included
nuclear generation as part of building block 3, but the final plan does not. See
Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, 385–86.  States can still use nuclear power genera-
tion to show reductions in GHGs per MWh produced, but the EPA did not include
nuclear generation in their determination of BSER. Id.
126. See id. at 437 (incremental RE generation will result in reduced genera-
tion and emissions from affected EGUs).
127. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 744 (discussing many utilities cur-
rent commitment to renewables).
128. See Key Changes and Improvements, supra note 6, at 3 (providing why the
commitment to renewable energy is feasible).
129. See Scott Detrow and Elizabeth Hardball, Final Clean Power Plan Shifts To-
ward Renewables and Away from Natural Gas, E&E Publishing (Aug. 4, 2015),
www.eenews.net/stories/1060022944 (noting that the final rule’s renewable de-
ployment estimates are “higher than the draft rule’s 22 percent estimate”).
130. See id.  (detailing how “renewable energy will make up 28 percent of total
generating capacity” in Final Clean Power Plan).
131. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 283 (providing different measures
EGUs could take).
The BSER also encompasses a variety of measures or actions that individ-
ual affected EGUs could take to implement the building blocks, includ-
ing (i) direct investment in efficiency improvements and in lower- and
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addition to the three building blocks, the Clean Power Plan dis-
cusses market-based trading programs, co-firing—or switching to—
natural gas at coal plants, transmission efficiency improvements,
plant retirements, expanding nuclear power, and any other meth-
ods a state can use to meet BSER.132  While the EPA set its reduc-
tion goals with these three building blocks as its baseline, the Clean
Power Plan is not absolutely mandatory and it only requires states to
“adequately demonstrate” BSER in their reduction plans.133
IV. POINTS OF CONTENTION
Challengers of the EPA’s proposed regulations will object to
the EPA’s statutory authority to promulgate the Clean Power Plan
and the EPA’s individual determinations regarding the Plan’s feasi-
bility and ultimate effect.134  Challengers will likely bring lawsuits
under each theory, but successful opponents will wait for state im-
plementation to challenge any individual determinations.135
A. Qualms with agency interpretation of authority under section
111(d)
Many opponents to the EPA’s Clean Power Plan already criti-
cize the agency’s broad interpretation of its section 111(d) author-
ity.136  However, as discussed in Section III of this Article,
zero-carbon generation, (ii) cross-investment in these activities through
mechanisms such as emissions trading approaches, where the state-estab-
lished standards of performance to which sources are subject incorporate
such approaches, and (iii) reduction of higher carbon generation.
Id.
132. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text for examples of other
possible tools states could implement to demonstrate equivalence with BSER.
133. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 9 (discussing how nothing in the
plan is absolutely mandatory).
134. See Tim Profeta, Challenges Ahead for Clean Power Plan, Another EPA Rule,
NAT. GEO. (Aug. 15, 2015), voices.nationalgeographic.com/2015/08/13/chal
lenges-ahead-for-clean-power-plan-another-epa-rule/ (discussing early challenges
to EPA’s interpretation of CAA section 111(d)); see also How to Kill the Coal Industry:
Implement EPA’s “Clean Power Plan,” IER (May 26, 2015), instituteforenergyresearch.
org/analysis/how-to-kill-the-coal-industry-implement-epas-clean-power-plan/ (tak-
ing issue with EPA’s determination of climate change benefits, burdens to consum-
ers, and burdens to coal industry).
135. See supra notes 130-157 and accompanying text for a discussion about
many points of contention with the Clean Power Plan.
136. See Marlo Lewis, How Unlawful is EPA’s Clean Power Plan, GLOBALWARM-
ING.ORG (Oct. 6, 2014), www.globalwarming.org/2014/10/06/how-unlawful-is-epas
-clean-power-plan/ (claiming that Clean Power Plan is unconstitutional); see also
Nicolas Loris, The Many Problems of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan and Climate Regula-
tions: A Primer, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (July 7, 2015), www.heritage.org/research/re
ports/2015/07/the-many-problems-of-the-epas-clean-power-plan-and-climate-regu
lations-a-primer (discussing different and problematic implication of the Clean
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opponents arguments against the EPA’s broad interpretation of
“any air pollutant” to include GHGs under CAA section 111(d) will
likely fail under Justice Scalia’s strict adherence to canons of statu-
tory construction.137  Opponents challenging the Clean Power
Plan’s “building block” framework claim that the EPA will inappro-
priately set “standards of performance,” which is a duty the CAA
explicitly delegates to the states.138  The EPA, conversely, contends
that state specific goals are merely a benchmark of BSER, and the
EPA Administrator retains the authority to determine whether the
standards are “adequately demonstrated” under the Clean Power
Plan.139  Consistent with the principles of agency deference under
Chevron, most courts will defer to the EPA’s interpretation of its
CAA section 111(d) authority.140  Under Chevron, the EPA only
needs to show that using the CAA to regulate existing GHG sources
was “reasonable.”141
Power Plan). See also Mario Loyola, Federal Coercion and the EPA’s Clean Power Plan:
An Obscure Provision of the Clean Air Act has Become the Basis for a Sweeping Effort to
Fight Climate Change. But is it Constitutional?, THE ATLANTIC (May 17, 2015),www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/federal-coercion-and-the-epas-clean-
power-plan/393389/ (arguing that Clean Air Act constitutes an unconstitutional
Congressional delegation of authority to EPA).
137. See supra notes 60-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice
Scalia’s interpretation.
138. See Seth Jaffe, What a Shock?! Nebraska’s Early Challenge to EPA’s Clean Power
Plan is Dismissed, FOLEY HOAG LLP (Oct. 8, 2014), www.lawandenvironment.com/
2014/10/08/what-a-shock-nebraskas-early-challenge-to-epas-clean-power-plan-is-dis
missed/ (arguing that EPA’s goals are arbitrarily based and amount to a takeover
of discretion properly left to states).  However, the EPA considered the statutory
BSER requirements: the cost of achieving, “any non air quality health and environ-
mental impact and energy requirements,” and expected lifetime of sources subject
to regulation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a), (d).  The EPA guidelines in the Clean Power
Plan, reflecting the state-federal government relationship set out in section 111(d),
adhere to the concerns laid out by the Supreme Court in Util. Air Regulatory Group.
See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of these factors ap-
plied to section 111(d) generally.
139. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 820 (detailing that State-specific
goals are an “expression of the BSER that state may choose to use to establish
emission standards for its affected EGUs” to demonstrate compliance).
140. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (providing that court must uphold a reasona-
ble interpretation of an ambiguity by an administering agency).
141. See A State Planning Guide for Clean Air Act Section 111(d), CNTR. FOR THE
NEW ENERGY ECONOMY 21 (June, 2014), available at cnee.colostate.edu/graphics/
uploads/CNEE_CAA-Section-111d-State-Planning-Guide-6_2014.pdf (“[A]ll state
air quality planning agencies are very familiar with the development of State Im-
plementation Plans (SIPs) used to maintain NAAQS standards and regulations for
criteria pollutants under § 111(b), which have many similarities to the state plans
required under § 111(d).”).
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B. Worries Over Burdens to Come
Most Clean Power Plan opponents raise concerns about the
Plan’s ultimate effects on states, EGUs, and the environment.142
These opponents believe that the Plan’s incentives for renewable
and low-emitting fuels will cause reliability issues, building blocks
two and three will amount to “fuel switching” and “fundamental
redesigns,” and the plan will serve to “kill coal” and unnecessarily
burden EGUs.143  On the other side of the debate, environmental
and public health advocates argue that the Clean Power Plan’s
building blocks are not aggressive enough to reduce the dangerous
effects of climate change.144
The EPA has considered both sides of the debate in promulgat-
ing its Final Clean Power Plan and bases its conclusions on a thor-
ough energy industry analysis, a detailed review of regional power
portfolios, a careful consideration of the nation’s overall energy
costs, and thoughtful policy reports from a variety of outside au-
thorities.145  Under the Final Clean Power Plan, the EPA predicts
142. See William Yeatman, EPA’s Clean Power Plan Overreach, COMPETITIVE EN-
TERPRISE INSTITUTE (July 28, 2015), https://cei.org/content/epa’s-clean-power-
plan-overreach (arguing that Clean Power Plan intrudes on regulatory decisions
best left to states, and highlighting difficulties states might have in complying); see
also How to Kill the Coal Industry: Implement EPA’s “Clean Power Plan,” IER (May 26,
2015), instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/how-to-kill-the-coal-industry-imple
ment-epas-clean-power-plan/ (addressing effects on coal industry); see also Alan
Philips, Obama’s Clean Power Plan does not go far Enough, THE NATIONAL (Aug. 6,
2015), www.thenational.ae/opinion/obamas-clean-power-plan-does-not-go-far-
enough (discussing immediate need to mitigate climate change as much as possi-
ble, and arguing that Clean Power Plan does not do as much as possible).
143. See Salva Andiappan, Potential Reliability Impacts of EPA’s Proposed Clean
Power Plan, MIDWEST RELIABILITY ORG (2014), https://midwestreliability.org/MRO
Documents/Potential%20Reliability%20Impacts%20of%20EPA’s%20Proposed%
20Clean%20Power%20Plan.pdf  (discussing reliability issues that Clean Power
Plan might produce); see also Brad Kenagy, Investment Implications of the President’s
Clean Power Plan, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 10, 2015), seekingalpha.com/article/3424
196-investment-implications-of-the-presidents-clean-power-plan (assessing market
impact on fossil fuel markets); see also How to Kill the Coal Industry: Implement EPA’s
“Clean Power Plan,” IER (May 26, 2015), instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/
how-to-kill-the-coal-industry-implement-epas-clean-power-plan/ (taking issue with
EPA’s determination of climate change benefits, burdens to consumers, and bur-
dens to coal industry).
144. See EPA’s Clean Power Plan May Not Go Far Enough, SCIENCE 2.0 (Nov. 14,
2014), available at www.science20.com/news_articles/epas_clean_power_plan_
may_not_go_far_enough-149143 (postulating that EPA “picked a number out of
thin air” when setting BSER standards); see also Michael Grunwald, 5 Reasons
Obama’s Transformative Power Plan Won’t Transform Anything, POLITICO (Aug. 2015),
www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/05/obama-transformative-energy-power-
plan-000016 (arguing that rule is “pretty weak,” and that Obama administration
crafted rule to “survive legal challenges”).
145. See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL
RULE, EPA at 8-1–8-4 (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
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that states will design their performance standards in ways that have
minimal reliability issues, no complete redesigns of plants, and
modest, if any, increases in overall energy cost.146  These relevant
EPA factual determinations are entitled to even more judicial defer-
ence than their statutory interpretations above, because, under the
Administrative Procedure Act, agency conclusions of fact are re-
viewed under a deferential, arbitrary and capricious standard.147  Fi-
nally, under the newly released Clean Power Plan, immediate
challengers present courts with ripeness issues because courts will
not want to adjudicate claims until their outcomes are
determinable.
In determining whether agency action is ripe for review, courts
make two determinations: (1) whether the issues tendered are ap-
propriate for judicial resolution; and (2) the hardship of the parties
if judicial relief is denied at the present stage.148  In Toilet Goods
Association v. Gardner, the Supreme Court held that a regulation
with permissive implementation criteria was not appropriate for re-
view because the practical effects were still speculative.149  The
Court also considered uncertainty regarding the type, probability,
and magnitude of effects important in assessing the likely harm of
postponing judicial review, because the plaintiffs did not yet know
whether the regulation would require them to change their “pri-
mary conduct.”150
Just as opponents did not have a ripe claim to challenge the
Clean Power Plan’s interpretive basis before it became a final regu-
2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf (comparing a wide range of benefits
and costs analyzed by multiple outside authorities); see also Study: Clean Power Plan
Could Save Thousands of Lives, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 4, 2015),
www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/05/04/epa-clean-power-plan-could-save-3-
500-lives-a-year-study-says (stating Clean Power Plan drew over 4.3 million com-
ments from interested stakeholders and public).
146. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 6, at 17, 21, 41, 48 (noting that plans in
the process of redesign will count toward meeting reduction goals).  The EPA even
requires states to consider any incidental affect on low-income ratepayers in pre-
paring their SIPs. Id. at 79.
147. See Administrative Procedure Act § 701(showing an agency’s factual con-
clusions are subject to an “arbitrary and capricious” standard). See also City of Kan-
sas City v. Dep’t of House & Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(providing that after an agency establishes statutory authority to act, it must act
using “reasoned decision-making” with respect to factual findings and
conclusions).
148. See Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162 (1967) (determining
whether issues were ripe for judicial resolution).
149. See id. (illustrating how practical effects could not be determined). Com-
pare Abbott Lab.s v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (initiating pre-enforcement judi-
cial review because the regulation at the time did not set out a general standard).
150. See Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. at 162 (discussing primary conduct).
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lation, opponents currently face ripeness issues when trying to liti-
gate the ultimate results of the plan.151  Like the regulations in
Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, since none of the Clean Power
Plan’s proposed tools are mandatory, courts can only guess what
types of implementation plans the states will develop.152  As a result,
a litigant alleging any actual harm to EGUs and utilities is specula-
tive because these same EGUs and utilities do not currently know
how they will have to change their “primary conduct.”153  For exam-
ple, states might opt to emphasize one building block over another,
or forego using the Plan’s building blocks altogether.154  Similarly,
the Clean Power Plan’s effect on reducing GHGs has not yet been
determined.155  The most substantive challenges to the Clean
Power Plan are, therefore, not currently ripe for review.  Until states
implement their own section 111(d) BSER standards, courts do not
have sufficient facts to conduct an adequate review.
While no determinations have been made, the EPA most likely
correctly used its authority in promulgating the Final Clean Power
Plan.  The EPA’s interpretations of its CAA authority will likely
stand because the EPA enjoys considerable deference in its inter-
pretation under Chevron.156  The EPA’s policy considerations will
also likely stand because policy conclusions are only subject to arbi-
trary and capricious review, and because policy effects analysis will
focus on individual state’s implementation plans.  Finally, the EPA’s
Clean Power Plan could possibly be struck down by a court if chal-
lengers can show definitive hardships across the nation, courts most
likely will be reluctant to completely strike down the EPA’s author-
151. See Emily Atkin, Judge: Lawsuit to Kill EPA Climate Rule ‘Runs Contrary to
Basic Law, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 8, 2014), thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/10/
08/3577581/nebraska-epa-climate-lawsuit-dismissed/ (stating court dismissed first
suit against EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan because it was not ripe for review).
152. See Brad Plumer, How Obama’s Clean Power Plan Actually Works, VOX (Aug.
5, 2015), www.vox.com/2015/8/4/9096903/clean-power-plan-explained (“[W]e
still don’t really know the ultimate impact of this rule.”).  “So much [of the rule]
depends on what states do, how utilities respond, whether courts uphold this rule,
and how the next president treats the rule.” Id.
153. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util.s Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 386 (1999) (stating that
when there is no immediate effect on plaintiff’s primary conduct, federal courts
normally do not entertain pre-enforcement challenges to agency rules and policy
statements).
154. See supra notes 95-97 (offering a few different examples).
155. See Plumer, supra note 153 (providing that Clean Power Plan’s effect on
reducing GHG’s has yet to be determined).
156. See supra notes 60-107 (explaining how EPA reasonably interpreted its
statutory authority).
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ity solely because some states improperly implement their BSER
plans.157
V. CONCLUSION
Guided by prevailing interpretations and insight from the Su-
preme Court, the EPA most likely made a reasonable interpretation
of its statutory authority under CAA 111(d) to regulate GHGs.158
Litigants that challenge the Clean Power Plan based on the EPA’s
interpretation of section 111(d) will most likely lose because courts
defer to agency’s reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory
authority under Chevron.159  Litigants bringing factual challenges
about the EPA’s policy determinations will most likely fail because
they face an even steeper burden having to prove the EPA acted in
an “arbitrary and capricious” manner.160  Additionally, until states
implement their own Clean Power Plan guided performance stan-
dards, no litigants will be able to challenge the standards, because
they will not be able to demonstrate they cause extreme burdens on
utilities or insufficiently aspire toward reduction goals.161 Ulti-
mately, none of the potential challenges will likely affect the Clean
Power Plan’s framework.
157. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (considering factual determinations based
only on information available to agency at time of action).
158. See supra notes 60-107 (explaining how EPA reasonably interpreted its
statutory authority).
159. See supra notes 140-141 (discussing Chevron standard).
160. See Administrative Procedure Act § 701; see also City of Kansas City, 923
F.2d at 189 (discussing more deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard from
APA § 701 for reviewing factual determinations made by an agency).
161. See Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. at 162 (refusing to hear a case involving
speculative harm).  These challenges will fail until they can show a definitive harm,
a substantial likelihood of such harm, or a required change in their “primary con-
duct.” Id.
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